Introduction
The tsunami of December 26, 2004, was devastating. Its most immediate, and tragic, impact was in terms of lives lost. The estimated number of people either dead or missing in Northern Sumatra's mainland and northwest islands is around 250,000, mostly women and children [1] . That alone is a trauma of barely imaginable proportions. In addition, the wave devastated survivors' livelihoods. Almost 595,000 people were made homeless and forced to seek shelter in temporary camps or with relatives elsewhere in the province; roughly 514,000 of them were still in temporary housing in mid-2005. Even noncoastal families were cut off from regular sources of income as markets were destroyed, service jobs disappeared, and export cash crops (particularly rubber) could no longer reach outside buyers.
But did such devastation translate into a food and/or nutrition crisis? In the immediate aftermath, there were media reports of survivors cut off without food and water. Claims were made that more people could die of cholera and other epidemic diseases than were killed by the tsunami itself. Many claims, but few facts. Hence the urgency of mobilizing needs assessment teams to define the actual food, nutrition, health, and other needs of affected people.
However, it was not easy to organize the required assessments. Aceh was a "closed" province in more ways than one. It had been wracked by internal conflict and political dissent for many years, putting it out of bounds to most international agencies and media. The few maps available showed little detail of the mountains and valleys that were home to separatist forces, as well as to the so-called Mohajedin-radicals with whom even the nationalist separatists clashed periodically. In addition, the earthquake and wave knocked out most of the roads, bridges, culverts, ports, and warehouses along a vast coastline. The first relief teams to get into Aceh really didn't know what to expect. Would there be widespread pre-existing malnutrition, as in Darfur? Would there be large-scale epidemics, as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo?
This paper describes some of the food and nutrition concerns taken up by the first assessment teams in Aceh. In this space it is impossible to adequately describe the extent of the logistics and security problems faced, or to do justice to the creative solutions dreamed up by humanitarian professionals on the spot.
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The aim here is merely to encourage further analysis and dialogue on lessons that still need to be learned, and on emerging concerns.
Emergency needs assessment
Four major international needs assessments were in progress during January and February 2005, led by various UN agencies in collaboration with the Indonesian government. It has been argued that this represented duplication, but in reality such assessments were sectorally focused, each dealing with its own relief mandate and generating information needed to tailor relief appropriately.
By far the largest UN-led mission was the World Health Organization's (WHO) Inter-Agency Health Assessment, supported by the US military.* The mission was based on board the aircraft carrier USS Lincoln, making daily helicopter sorties to the mainland. The team members attempted to see what they could around dropoff zones, focusing mainly on health matters, but offering limited information on food needs or nutrition concerns [4] .
The second major UN-led assessment was conducted by the World Food Programme in collaboration with numerous nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and local authorities, which focused on the food needs of survivors and on the longer-term impact on food insecurity. Countless NGOs worked alongside the United Nations in conducting these main assessments, including Save the Children, Catholic Relief Services, CARE, Mercy Corps, World Vision, and others. Some also produced their own assessment results, such as Helen Keller International [5, 6] . The team did not conduct explicit nutrition surveys but considered dietary quality and quantity, breastfeeding practices, availability of clean water, sanitation arrangements, population displacements, availability of traditional and other coping mechanisms, income sources, and effects on market prices. The team provided considerable information on changes in consumption patterns, prices, and livelihood disruption, but little on nutrition outcomes [7] .
The third was a joint UNICEF/CDC (US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention) nutrition survey based on a convenience sample of 19 camps in and around Banda Aceh/Aceh Besar. This was focused on the status of recently displaced people living in the often crowded and unsanitary temporary camps. It offered the most detailed nutrition and health information, but little information about food security or livelihood context [8] .
The fourth was a rapid visual assessment of crop and livestock losses, farmland and plantation damage, and destruction of fishery assets led by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations. This mission provided detail on agricultural impacts and reconstruction needs, but nothing on immediate nutritional implications [9] .
None of these four assessments attempted to be statistically representative of the population of Aceh, or even of the directly affected population. There were significant security and logistical constraints that made household interviews, anthropometric measurements, and even visual assessments extremely hazardous in many locations. As a result, sample frames were established on the basis of broad geographic parameters (distance from the coast, main typologies of livelihood, distance from main urban centers, size of temporary camps, etc.), rather than on populationbased sampling. The WHO teams visited around 30 locations (usually for a few hours each), the World Food Programme and its partners visited 18 sites (for up to an entire day each), and UNICEF/CDC visited 14 sites (for the hours needed to complete weights and measurements).
Assessment findings
Although the assessments focused principally on different domains, taken together they dovetailed to produce a mosaic of insights into the impact of the disaster on nutrition and food security for different population groups. At a macroeconomic level, it quickly emerged that the disaster would have far-reaching effects on livelihoods. For example, many tens of thousands of fishing families lost everything they had-their assets, as well as medium-term income streams. (Demand for fish plummeted for many months following the tsunami, as locals believed that fish were "unclean" because so many humans perished in the ocean.) Farming, formal business, and petty trading were badly affected in absolute terms, particularly in areas located within 5 km of the coast; these effects were exerted mainly through immediate loss of assets, including standing crops and animals, as well as the destruction of markets, roads, and warehouses. The loss of durable and productive * At the height of the relief effort, around 16,000 US military personnel were deployed in the affected areas, based on two dozen US ships (including an aircraft carrier battle group, a Marine amphibious group, and the hospital ship USNS Mercy), and more than 100 aircraft-all at an estimated cost of some $5 million a day [2] . More than a dozen other countries also sent military capabilities to the regions affected. The inappropriateness of military support for humanitarian relief in complex emergencies has been widely agreed upon; however, similar consensus does not yet exist on the role of the military in support of relief in a natural disaster [3] . Although the military was generally praised for its role in the tsunami response, more discussion is needed on the political sensitivities involved, how much of its contribution represented value added (rather than substitution for activities of humanitarian agencies), and how cost-effective it was (an analysis demanded of relief agencies).
assets was extensive in all parts of Aceh-urban areas, the east coast, and the west coast. However, households depending on casual labor were less affected because of the upsurge in demand for labor for clearing and reconstruction.
The disruption of markets and trade had a marked effect on the prices of food and other commodities. Increases of 80% to 225% were recorded for various goods, depending on location (west coast communities saw much greater price increases than those on the east coast), demand for the commodity, and the size of pre-existing stocks [7] . For example, the cost of farm inputs (mainly fertilizer) rose by 85% in the month or so following the tsunami because of a curtailed supply and the need to replant paddy crops that had been destroyed. Most food prices rose even higher-85% for meat, 95% for cooking oil, and between 100% and 225% for pulses and staple cereals. Interestingly, the price of cleaning agents also rose sharply because of the need for disinfection; the price of soap rose by more than 80%, and the price of sanitary products (for personal hygiene) increased by 50% to 100%.
The leap in prices affected food consumption. On the basis of 24-hour recalls, it was found that 15% of the households interviewed were eating only one meal per day at the time of interview (almost one month after the shock), while another 30% were still eating only two meals per day. Moreover, dietary quality was suffering [7] . Most of the displaced people had an imbalanced and monotonous diet, especially if they were located on or near the west coast. For example, although most assessed households across all of Aceh were consuming at least one animal product per day (dried fish, eggs, or meat), around 80% of the households on the west coast had none of these items in their diet. Similarly, 42% of west coast dwellers were consuming no pulses at all, and almost 80% had no fats or oils. Their meals consisted of cereals, either rice or noodles, with little else other than fruits, which were plentiful despite the widespread destruction of coconut and papaya plantations.
The nutritional dangers posed by such widespread dietary deficiencies were obvious. It was decided to enhance food aid deliveries to ensure that they contained not only rice and micronutrient-fortified noodles (purchased in Indonesia), but also vitamin Afortified vegetable oil (procured in the region), canned fish (from Japan), iodized salt, and multimicronutrient-fortified biscuits (from India). High importance was placed on ensuring not only adequate quantities of food for affected people, but also optimum micronutrient quality. Also obvious were the dangers posed by trauma, followed by physical displacement, followed by concentration of people in makeshift camps unequipped to provide clean water or appropriate sanitation. Initially it was feared that diarrhea, cholera, and malaria might greatly increase the death toll.
Fortunately, efforts to anticipate such problems were relatively effective in controlling outbreaks of disease or micronutrient deficiencies. However, malnutrition was a concern.
The UNICEF/CDC nutrition survey of around 600 children younger than five years in selected camps in Banda Aceh found a level of global acute malnutrition (wasting) of 12.7%, with a prevalence of severe acute malnutrition of 1.5%. As is often the case in natural disasters, and as is the case throughout Indonesia, boys were worse off than girls [8] . Roughly 15% of adult nonpregnant women were found to be at risk for chronic energy deficiency, as manifested by bodymass index (BMI) levels under 18.5. These rates were thought to reflect worsening conditions in many camps, although the rate of pre-existing malnutrition was also high and played a role. Other nutrition surveys by NGOs found similar levels of wasting in and around Banda Aceh, while an additional, later survey by Helen Keller International on the islands of Nias and Simeuleu found higher levels of wasting among children 12 to 24 months (23%), but levels similar to those in Banda Aceh among children 6 to 59 months [6] .
By the end of January, Indonesia's Ministry of Health invited UNICEF, WHO, the World Food Programme, and many other agencies to collaborate in setting up a province-wide, more representative baseline on nutrition and health to serve as a platform for regular surveillance. The first round of data found high anemia rates (59% among displaced preschoolers compared with 47% among the nondisplaced), but the prevalence of wasting among under-fives was generally less than 12%.
Assessment of lessons
So was there a food and nutrition crisis in Aceh posttsunami? Most certainly, yes [3] . But it was not a crisis as defined by commonly used thresholds for child mortality and wasting. Although the prevalence of wasting was high and climbing, it was not generally above the widely used "trigger point" of 15% prevalence of -2 SD weight-for-height among preschoolers. Under-five mortality was of course high on December 26 itself, but it did not become elevated above background levels in the months that followed, thanks to rapid health, shelter, and food interventions that stabilized the situation.
Nevertheless, there was a danger of major loss of life in the absence of such interventions. That much was clear from the limited, diminished quality of the diet, abrupt changes in dietary patterns, a huge increase over pre-existing levels in the price of food and agricultural inputs, and compromised access to food markets due to destroyed infrastructure. Income flows were compromised for many hundreds of thousands of families, as they lost not only productive assets but their formal and nonformal livelihoods. Malnutrition was a concern, particularly among those temporarily settled in overcrowded and unsanitary camps where the threat of communicable disease, including diarrhea, was serious. And there was also a danger that precrisis levels of micronutrient deficiencies (which were already high, particularly on the west coast of Aceh) would evolve into outbreaks of specific life-threatening vitamin and mineral deficiency diseases. All in all, there was a postshock humanitarian disaster in the making.
One conclusion is that a single, multisectoral assessment seeking to identify all of these problems among all population groups in all parts of the island simultaneously would arguably not have produced better information than was derived from four separate missions. A composite image of "needs" is important, partly for cross-validation and triangulation of information, and partly because of separate programmatic foci that allow each agency to delve into the operational issues pertaining to its particular mandate. Thus, recent calls for a single agency to conduct needs assessments, or for more centralized control of information-gathering, should be tempered by consideration of operational objectives. The process of data collection should be systematized rather than centralized; it is the process of interpreting data, with a view to optimal response, that needs better coordination. That is, predetermined agreement is needed on survey methods and sampling frames for such assessments, and building of local skills must of necessity pre-date the occurence of any emergencies. An important hurdle to rapid needs assessments is finding appropriately skilled nationals able to work as enumerators, supervisors, and data analysts. Such skill sets have to be built up over time, which requires investments in human capital specifically in countries most prone to disasters-which are often the places least likely to receive such investments.
A second conclusion is that information on nutrition should not be collected, interpreted, or even acted upon in isolation from a broader understanding of the nature of food insecurity, extent of livelihood collapse, water and sanitation needs, and likely dietary trends. Nutrition is not a sector; it is a multifaceted problem that cuts across conventional, narrowly focused sector coordination groups that are set up in most disaster situations. In other words, nutrition has to move from being a mere benchmark of the problem to become a key organizing principle for the solution across all sectors.
It has been argued that the relief response to the tsunami "is a story of aid done right" [10] . If that be true, it can be attributed to a rapid response on a massive scale, quick assessments of need that translated into fine-tuned interventions across multiple sectors, effective coordination among a great number of agencies, and a clear sense that preventing a deterioration in the food and nutrition situation was going to be central to efforts to move quickly from relief into reconstruction.
